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Depression is one of the most ubiquitous emotions. The 
feelings of sadness, dejection, and helplessness may follow 
any experience of having lost someone or something that was 
an important source of security and satisfaction. 
Therefore, it is important to recognize that everyone is at 
risk of experiencing at least transient depressive feelings 
over the course of a lifetime. For the most part, the 
depressive feelings may come and go without becoming a 
matter of concern for the clinician. However, there seem to 
be a widespread increase in the frequency of depression in 
the general population and we are now entering an "age of 
melancholy" (Perris, 1987). To put depression in 
perspective as a clinical disorder, the lifetime risk for 
Major Depressive Disorder has varied from 10% to 25% for 
women and from 5% to 12% for men. The point prevalence for 
adults is from 5% to 9% for women and from 2% to 3% for men 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV, 
1994). Even to view depression within the guidelines of a 
clinical syndrome, it should be noted that depression is a 
pervasive condition and is worthy of further research. 
For the most part, there is still a need for a 
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comprehensive theory that integrates findings from diverse 
fields of research to understand the different aspects of 
depression. These aspects include course, severity, 
reactivity to specific external events, biological 
variables, relations to personality characteristics and 
response to treatment. Although these numerous variables 
are recognized as relevant and worthy of further 
investigations, this study would like to examine a specific 
aspect of personality vulnerability that has been given much 
attention from researchers. 
Investigators from diverse theoretical orientations 
have suggested that individual differences in personality 
may moderate the potential of negative life events to 
induce psychopathology. Two particular personality 
dimensions - representing ego-investment in interpersonal 
relationships and in autonomous achievement - have been 
extensively discussed as relating to increased depressive 
vulnerability in reaction to adverse experiences (see 
reviews by Blatt & Zuroff, 1992; Nietzel & Harris, 1990; 
Robins, 1994). These two personality dimensions have been 
contrasted against each other using various labels, 
including "dominant other" vs. "dominant goal" orientation 
(Arieti & Bemporad, 1980), "dependency" vs. "self-criticism" 
(Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976), and "sociotropy" vs. 
"autonomy" (Beck, 1983). Despite some significant 
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differences among these conceptual distinctions (see Blatt & 
Maroudas, 1992; Robins, 1994; Bartelstone and Trull, 1995), 
there is a great deal of overlap, suggesting a common 
theoretical stance. Most theoretical and empirical 
attention in this area has been given to Beck's 
sociotropy/autonomy dichotomy. 
Sociotropy refers to the individual's degree of 
investment in positive interactions with other people. A 
highly sociotropic individual places great value on 
interpersonal relations and so tries to satisfy the needs 
for security and self-worth by pleasing others and winning 
their approval and acceptance. The highly sociotropic 
individual will often act in ways that please others in 
order to secure their positive reactions. Therefore, this 
individual is more likely to find negative interpersonal 
events distressing. 
Autonomy refers to a person's need for independence and 
the attainment of individualized goals. Highly autonomous 
persons value independence, mastery and solitude. They are 
acutely concerned about the possibility of personal failure 
and often act in ways to maximize their control over the 
environment and thereby to reduce the possibility of 
failure. As a result, the highly autonomous individual is 
more likely to find negative life events that threaten one's 
independence, competence, and freedom of choice particularly 
distressing. 
Differential cognitive-affective reactions to adverse 
events as a function of sociotropy and autonomy can be 
distinguished from the coping strategies that people employ 
subsequent to such reactions. This is not to say that the 
two personality dimensions do not relate to differential 
coping (see Beck, 1983), but that their relation to initial 
reactions to negative life events is itself significant for 
understanding psychological adjustment. 
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Beck (1983) has suggested that the depressed person 
tends to reflect a predominance of one or the other 
dimension in their preoccupying concerns. In the wider 
population, however, the dimensions have been shown to be 
virtually uncorrelated as fairly stable dimensions of 
personality, suggesting that a person can be high or low on 
one or both dimensions. Beck's cognitive theory of 
depression proposes that the cognitive-personality 
constructs of sociotropy and autonomy interact with specific 
types of negative life events in precipitating depression 
(Beck, 1983.) According to this "congruency hypothesis," 
each of the two cognitive-personality dimensions presents a 
specific psychological vulnerability to negative life events 
that are thematically-related to the dimension. That is, a 
high degree of sociotropy puts an individual at increased 
risk for depressive reactions to a negative interpersonal 
event involving rejection, conflict, or loss, but not to a 
negative achievement-related events, involving failure,_ 
constraint, or weakness. A high degree of autonomy should 
contribute to the opposite pattern of specific risk. For 
example, a high sociotropic individual would get more 
depressed over a romantic break-up than a loss of promotion 
at work. On the other hand, a high autonomous individual 
would be more likely to get depressed over a negative job 
evaluation than a conflict with a significant other. 
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Beyond its direct relevance for predicting the onset of 
clinical depression, the congruency hypothesis permits the 
more general suggestion that increases in depressive 
symptomatology in response to negative life events will in 
part be determined by the types of events and one's levels 
of sociotropy and autonomy, considered as continuous 
dimensions of personality rather than as discrete 
personality types. Specifically, the theory suggests that 
those higher on the sociotropy dimension will show enhanced 
psychological sensitivity to interpersonal stressor, in the 
form of showing greater increases in depressive symptoms in 
reaction to such stressor. In contrast, those higher on the 
autonomy dimension should show greater increases in 
depressive symptoms in response to achievement-related 
rather than interpersonal adversity. This reasoning 
represents the broadest interpretation of the congruency 
hypothesis. It holds that even sub-clinical variation in 
negative thought and feeling over time can be in part 





Empirical tests of the congruency hypothesis both in 
specific relation to diagnosed depression and, more 
generally, in relation to variation in subclinical levels of 
depressive symptoms - have included both concurrent and 
prospective studies. Unfortunately, the results have been 
less than consistent. 
Hammen, Marks, Mayol, & deMayo (1985) followed 
ninety-three college over time with four monthly interview 
and questionnaire assessments of depression. Using a 
distinction offered by Blatt et al. (1976), the authors 
classified participants as primarily "dependent" or "self-
critical" in their personal concerns. Dependent concerns 
are those pertaining mainly to social attachments and self-
critical concerns are those pertaining mainly to individual 
achievement. As defined by Blatt et al., the dependent 
personality is highly similar to the sociotropic depressive 
subtype and the self-critical personality is highly similar 
to the autonomous subtype. 
The authors predicted that the dependent subgroup would 
show significantly greater increase in depression in 
response to negative interpersonal events than in response 
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to other types of events. This was found to be the case. 
It was also predicted that the self-critical subgroup wpuld 
show significantly greater increase in depression in 
response to negative achievement-related events than in 
response to other types of events. This was also found to 
be the case, that the pattern here was less pronounced. 
Robins and Block (1988) tested the congruency 
hypothesis directly by looking at whether sociotropy and 
autonomy relate to depressive vulnerability to specific 
types of life events. They administered a battery of 
questionnaires to an unrestricted sample of undergraduate 
students. The questionnaires measured level of depressive 
symptoms, sociotropy and autonomy, and self-reported number 
of negative life events that had occurred in the three 
months prior to the time of testing. 
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The results revealed that sociotropy qualified the 
association of depression to frequency of recent negative 
social events, as predicted. That is, respondents higher in 
sociotropy showed a stronger positive association between 
level of depression and frequency of negative interpersonal 
events. However, in contrast to the congruency predictions, 
sociotropy interacted in the same way with negative 
achievement-related events. Moreover, autonomy did not 
qualify the association of either type of life event with 
depression. The weakness of these findings as support for 
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the hypotheses leaves it somewhat surprising that the 
authors interpreted the study as generally supporting "the 
utility of a person-event interaction approach to 
depression." However, limitations of the study suggest 
caution in over interpreting the significance of the results 
for the congruency hypothesis. First, the use of an adult 
life events checklist may have been somewhat inadequate in 
accommodating events specific to college students, 
especially in relation to achievement. This might explain 
the lack of findings for autonomy. Second, the authors do 
not report the degree of correlation between negative 
interpersonal and negative achievement events. A 
significant correlation here might account for the 
unexpected interaction between sociotropy and negative 
achievement events, as this interaction was not tested 
independently of the sociotropy x negative interpersonal 
events interaction. 
In a pair of studies, Robins (1990) tested the 
hypothesis that depressed persons would report more recent 
threat from personality-congruent events than from 
incongruent events. In the first study, a clinically 
depressed sample and a non-depressed schizophrenic sample 
were compared in relation to the congruency hypothesis. The 
hypothesis was supported for sociotropy but not for autonomy 
in the depressed sample. That is, depressed patients high 
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in sociotropy reported more recent negative interpersonal 
events than negative autonomy events and interpreted th~se 
events more negatively than did depressed patients high in 
autonomy. However, no evidence of such congruence was found 
among nondepressed schizophrenic patients. Robins suggest 
that the congruence effect does not generalize to all 
psychopathologies. In the second study, significant 
personality-event congruence was found weakly (the trends 
were not significantly significant) in a sample of dysphoric 
students. This held for both high-sociotropy and 
high-autonomy dysphoric groups. However, no pattern of 
congruence was evident in a matched sampled of nondysphoric 
students. In neither study did nondepressed subjects show 
any evidence of personality-event congruence. A major 
limitation of this study is the use of personality 
categories in hypothesis-testing. That is, rather than look 
at the significance of sociotropy and autonomy as continuous 
dimensions of personality, participants were classified into 
groups (e.g., high sociotropy/low autonomy) using lax 
cutoffs and then means-testing was used to examine the 
hypotheses. The crudeness and loss of information inherent 
in this method could itself account for the absence of 
effects for the nondepressed group, whose variance on the 
other variables was quite low. The import of the findings 
for the validity of the theory is therefore left unclear. 
11 
Using undergraduate students, Clark and Oates (1995) 
investigated the relations of Beck's cognitive-personaljty 
constructs with specific types of negative life events in 
the onset of reactive depression. They also examined the 
influence of negative life event severity on personality and 
life event congruency, in line with their proposal that 
personality-based vulnerability may only be evident in the 
context of moderate or severe types of negative life events. 
A significant interaction between autonomy and negative 
autonomy-related stressors was found, as predicted, in 
contrast to the failure of most other studies to clearly 
reveal this expected pattern. Surprisingly, however, 
sociotropy did not interact significantly with interpersonal 
daily hassles or life stressors. 
Hammen, Ellicott, Gitlin, and Jamison (1989) assessed 
stressful life events and symptoms in samples of unipolar 
and bipolar outpatients for a six-month period following 
self-report assessment of sociotropy and autonomy. They 
found that exacerbation of depressive symptoms was 
associated more with subjects' experience from negative 
events that were thematically related to their predominant 
personality dimension than from events that were 
thematically unrelated. As the proportion of the samples 
experiencing significant relapse during the period of study 
were quite small, however, it was not possible to separately 
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analyze the effects for sociotropic and autonomous patient 
groups. Hammen, Ellicott, and Gitlin (1989) report similar 
findings with a longer follow-up. 
Taken together, the studies described above do provide 
a degree of support for the congruency hypothesis. At the 
same time, the marked inconsistency in findings across 
studies is somewhat disquieting for the theory. Because 
this inconsistency is accompanied by significant variance 
across studies in basic design, measuring instruments, and 
sample type, however, the source of the disparate findings 
is left unclear. It therefore seems warranted to conduct 
further research testing the congruency hypothesis, but 
while giving special attention to methodological features 
suspected of potentially obscuring effects in previous 
research. If these more refined tests yield similarly 
inconsistent results, then a reexamination of the validity 
of the theory would be appropriate. Several methodological 
aspects could be argued to be especially relevant here. 
One major limitation of some of the previous studies is 
their reliance upon cross-sectional design using concurrent 
measurement (e.g., Bartelstone & Trull, 1995; Clark & Oates, 
1995; Robins & Block, 1988). Whereas the congruency 
hypothesis defines processes of change that are expressed 
over time, the majority of studies to date have not tested 
the hypothesis using a longitudinal design. They have 
instead opted for more economical but less focused designs 
relying on concurrent measurement. As Clark and Oates 
(1995) note, such designs preclude any safe inferences 
regarding the causal relations between personality, life 
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events, and depression, as specified by the congruency 
hypothesis. Bartelstone and Trull (1995) and Robins and 
Block (1988) in fact cite this as a shortcoming of their own 
studies. It is possible that depression may "cause" 
differences in personality just as well as the other way 
around. Also, responses to life-events inventories then may 
reflect effects or symptoms of depression as much as causes 
of it. This being the case, further research should utilize 
prospective or longitudinal designs capable of providing 
clearer information regarding causality. 
A second potential limitation in previous studies is 
the reliance upon standardized checklists to assess 
frequency of life events. It is not clear that such 
inventories are adequately and equally representative of 
negative life events for different types of people. 
Bartelstone and Trull (1995) recognize this problem in their 
study in pointing out that the range of life events indexed 
may have been restricted by the nature of the checklist 
used, thereby blunting the sensitivity of measurement. 
As suggested before, standardized adult checklists may 
be especially inadequate in representing negative 
14 
achievement-related events specific to the lives of college 
students, the population utilized in the majority of 
previous studies. This inadequacy might account for past 
problems in confirming the predicted role of autonomy in 
relation to negative achievement-related events and 
depression. 
One solution to this inadvertent restriction is to use 
open-ended self-report life event instruments, which 
allowing respondents to report personally significant life 
events in a generally unconstrained manner. At least when 
applied to short-term retrospective measurement, such 
instruments are likely to be superior and relatively 
unhampered by significant memory bias. 
Purpose of Present Study 
Before the congruency hypothesis can be said to be 
seriously challenged by empirical findings, it is necessary 
to conduct tests that are free of the limitations described 
above. If such tests do not provide adequate support for 
the theory, then the theory may have to be revised. For 
example, it may be that sociotropy and autonomy are poorly 
conceived dimensions of personality and may actually 
represent aspects of better understood dimensions such as 
extroversion, neuroticism, or self-esteem. Alternatively, 
it may be that the two dimensions are not as important for 
understanding depression as posited by Beck and others. 
On the other hand, if more refined tests do clearly 
confirm the hypothesis, then it could be argued that t~e 
inconclusiveness of past findings is attributable more to 
methodological than theoretical weakness. 
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The present study is aimed at providing a sounder test 
of the congruency hypothesis. It examines the broad form of 
the hypothesis in an unrestricted sample while attempting to 
avoid the limitations described above. Specifically: 1) a 
longitudinal design is used to facilitate safer inferences 
about the causal direction of any associations found; 2) an 
open-ended life events record is used to allow unconstrained 
indexing of personally significant events; 3) transient mood 
effects that could add to measurement error are 
statistically controlled for; and 4) the personality 
dimensions of sociotropy and autonomy are examined as 
continuous variables rather then using scores to crudely 
create arbitrary groups. 
In line with the congruency hypothesis, it is predicted 
that the association of frequency of negative interpersonal 
events with increases in depressive symptoms across a 
four-week period will be greater at higher levels of 
sociotropy. No such interaction is expected for negative 
achievement-related events and sociotropy. At the same 
time, it is predicted that the association of negative 
achievement-related events with increases in depressive 
symptoms will be greater at high levels of autonomy. 
To the knowledge of this author, no published studies 
have examined these continuous interactive effects in 
relations to change in depressive levels over a short time 
period. The few previous prospective studies have looked 
primarily at onset and recurrence of diagnosed depression 






College students were administered a questionnaire 
twice, with a four-week interval between sessions. The 
questionnaire included self-report measures of depressive 
symptomatology, sociotropy, autonomy, relative mood, and 
recent life events. 
Change in level of depression from Time 1 to Time 2 was 
examined as a function of the personality dimensions 
measured at Time 1 and the number of negative life events 
that had occurred during the four-week interval. Analyses 
were conducted to see if sociotropy and autonomy moderated 
the effect of negative life events on depression as 
specified by the congruency hypothesis. 
Participants 
Sixty-five participants volunteered to take part in the 
study in response to the author's verbal invitation. Out of 
the sixty-five participants who picked up the questionnaire, 
fourty-four returned the initial questionnaire. Twenty-eight 
of the original 44 took part in the second session four 
weeks later. The final participants were all females. 
Nearly all were graduate students in the School of Education 
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at Loyola University Chicago. The age range was 23-48. 
Participants were told that the study concerned recent 
experiences, attitudes and moods. Confidentiality and 
anonymity were assured by using a numbering system rather 
than the participants' names to identify questionnaires. 
Measures and Procedure 
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Participants completed six measures, four of which are 
relevant here (see Appendix}. The set of measures took 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961}. The BDI is an self-report inventory 
for measuring depression and consists of 21 items 
representing various depressive "symptom-attitude 
categories" (Beck, 1976) - behaviors, thoughts, and feelings 
associated with general depression. The reliability and 
validity of the BDI have generally been found to be adequate 
(see Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988, for a review). For 
example, Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the items has most 
often found to be greater than .80. Each item appears as 
3-5 statements of graduated severity; respondents indicate 
which of the four levels corresponds to the way they 
presently feel. Higher scores represent greater levels of 
depression. 
Sociotropy-Autonomy scale (SAS; Clark & Beck, 1991). 
The SAS consists of 93 fir~t-person statements representing 
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the personality dimensions of sociotropy and autonomy. 
Respondents indicate degree of agreement to the assertions 
using a 5-point Likert scale anchored with (1) strongly 
disagree and (5) strongly agree. Given the excessive length 
of the measure, the factor-analytic findings of Clark and 
Beck (1991) were used to select the 8 items most 
representative of the single factor of sociotropy and the 24 
items (3 x 8) most representative of the three factors 
comprising autonomy. Sociotropy and autonomy scores 
represent the sum of responses on the two sets of items. 
Life Events Record (LER; Tafarodi & Davies, 1995). The 
LER is designed to retrospectively assess the number and 
nature of positive and negative life events in the 
respondent's life. Given its reliance on accurate recall, 
it is best used for relatively short retrospective periods 
(up to six months). Respondents are required to recall all 
personally significant events that have occurred during a 
specified time period, indicating whether each was 
experienced as positive or negative. Each event is briefly 
described and the subjective intensity of its positive or 
negative impact is rated on a 9-point scale anchored by mild 
(1) and very strong (9). The total numbers of negative and 
positive events, and the sums of their rated intensities, 
can then be computed. 
Relative Mood. A single item created by the author was 
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used to index mood at both times of measurement. 
Participants indicated on a 9-point scale how good/bad they 
were feeling at the time they filled out the questionnaires, 
relative to how they have been feeling over the past few 
days. This items was intended to control for acute 
fluctuations in mood immediately prior to the time of 
measurement. Such fluctuations that could potentially bias 
responses on the other scales. 
Participants filled out identical questionnaires on the 
two occasions, with the exception that the retrospective 
period for the LER was six months at Time 1 and four weeks 
(the interim) at Time 2. (In fact, only the interim-period 
measure was used in hypothesis-testing.) The short, four-
week interval was decided on to minimize the role of memory 
bias in the retrospective reporting of life events during 
the critical period. Arbitrary numbers were assigned to the 
questionnaires to match them across sessions. This allowed 
participants to fill out the questionnaires honestly and 
accurately without concern over having their names 
associated with their responses. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Two of the 28 participants with complete data were 
eliminated as univariate or multivariate outliers on the 
variables used in the analyses that follow, leaving a final 
sample of 26 subjects. 
To facilitate testing of hypotheses, each LER event 
description was independently categorized by two coders as 
being interpersonal-related (I events), achievement-related 
(A events), or otherwise in nature. The otherwise category 
was used for any events that were not seen as being clearly 
either A or O. The coders were provided with written 
guidelines for what qualified as each type of event. These 
guidelines were based on the theory provided by Beck (1983). 
The coders concurred on 90% of the events, arguably an 
adequate level of agreement. Discrepancies were resolved by 
the judgment of a third independent rater using the same 
guidelines. For each participant, the number of negative I 
events and the number of negative A events experienced 
during the four-week interim were computed and these 
frequency scores were used in the analyses described below. 
To examine the predictive relations that make up the 
congruence hypothesis, standard (simultaneous) multiple 
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regression models were tested. Depression (BDI score) at 
Time 2 served as the dependent variable. The predictor. or 
regressor variables included the following. 
22 
Depression (BDI score) at Time 1. By including this 
variable in the simultaneous regression, the other 
predictors could be tested for their predictive associations 
with that portion of the variance in depression at Time 2 
that was independent of depression at Time 1. This 
independent variance represents the change in depression 
across the two measurements. Hence, the other predictors 
were essentially associated with the degree to which 
participants changed in their level of depression. Owing to 
its flexibility, this method of looking at change is more 
statistically sound than using a simple difference score 
(Time 2 minus Time 1) as the dependent variable (see 
Cronbach & Furby, 1970). 
Negative I and A events. These two LER frequencies 
were entered as separate predictors in the regression 
models. This allowed the average impact of the two types of 
negative life events on depression to be independently 
gauged. Severity ratings were not used, as it was feared 
that such judgments may be highly susceptible to individual 
differences as a function of sociotropy and autonomy, 
resulting in clouded hypothesis-testing. The event 
frequencies themselves, however, would not be as susceptible 
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to as much influence. 
Sociotropy and autonomy. The two SAS subscale scores 
were entered as separate predictors, allowing the average 
impact of the two personality dimensions on depression to be 
independently gauged. 
Relative mood. Both mood at Time 1 and mood and Time 2 
were entered as predictors to control for any transient mood 
effects, as described before. This ensured that all 
participants were effectively rendered equivalent on 
relative mood (relative to their individual baseline over 
the previous few days), thus refining the testing of other 
predictive relations. 
Means and standard deviations for the above variables 
are given in Table 1. It should be noted that the mean BDI 
scores at Time 1 and Time 2 were below 9, falling in the 
non-depressed category according to the norms of Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, and Erbaugh (1961). This confirms the expected 
low levels of depression in the unselected student sample 
used, and affords generalizability of any findings to a 
wider non-clinical population. All other means were in the 
expected ranges. 
TABLE 1 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR ALL VARIABLES 
n=26 
Variable Mean S. D. Range 
Depression at Time 1 6.96 6.07 0-26 
Depression at Time 2 5.81 4.96 0-18 
Autonomy 73.73 8.59 61-91 
Sociotropy 26.12 5.05 17-36 
Negative Interpersonal 0.35 0.63 0-2 
Events at Time 2 
Negative Achievement 0.92 1.02 0-3 
Events at Time 2 
Mood 1 4.81 1. 74 2-8 
Mood 2 5.42 1. 58 1-8 
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Intercorrelations are given in Table 2. As found in 
past studies, sociotropy and autonomy were not significantly 
correlated, L(26) = -.02, ~ > .05, supporting their 
construal as orthogonal dimensions of personality. Not 
surprisingly, depression was moderately stable over the 
four-week interval, L(26) = .62, ~ < .005. The correlation 
of negative I and A events was marginal in significance,~= 
-.40, ~ < .05, allaying concerns about high collinearity for 
these variables in the regressions. 
TABLE 2 
INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES 
Variable 
1.Depression 
at Time 1 
2.Depression 







Events at Time 2 
6.Negative Achievement 
Events at Time 2 
7. Mood at Time 1 
8. Mood at Time 2 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .005. 
4 5 6 
.34 -.22 .09 
.42* .20 .06 












The specific predictions representing the congruency 
hypothesis were tested using two separate regression models, 
one testing the moderating role of sociotropy and the other 
the moderating role of autonomy. All variables were 
standardized prior to regression analysis. 
sociotropy 
In the first model, depression at Time 2 was regressed on 
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depression at Time 1, sociotropy, negative I and A events, 
and relative mood at Times 1 and 2. Two additional 
predictor terms were constructed, to represent the 
interaction of sociotropy with negative I events and with 
negative A events. If sociotropy does indeed moderate the 
impact of negative interpersonal events on depression, as 
predicted, then the sociotropy x I events interaction should 
emerge as significant. At the same time, as sociotropy is 
not predicted to moderate the impact of negative 
achievement-related events on depression, the sociotropy x A 
events interaction should not emerge as significant. 
The resulting standardized regression coefficients and 
corresponding significance tests are presented in Table 3. 
The significance of depression at Time 1 as a predictor 
confirms the stability of depression over time, as reflected 
in the zero-order correlation already noted. Relative mood 
at Time 2 also emerged as significant, confirming its 
importance as a control variable. The negative sign of the 
coefficient reveals that the worse mood was at the time of 
measurement, relative to how it had been over the previous 
few days, the greater was the increase in depression above 
Time 1 level. Frequency of negative I events also emerged 
as significant, with higher frequencies relating to greater 
increase in depression. More importantly however, this 
average association was moderated by sociotropy, as 
reflected in the significant sociotropy x I events 
interaction. 
TABLE 3 
RESULTS FOR REGRESSION EXAMINING SOCIOTROPY 
IN RELATION TO DEPRESSION AT TIME 2 
Variable Beta Standard Error .t 
Depression .63 .13 4.9 .0001 
at Time 1 
Sociotropy .20 .12 1. 7 .11 
Negative .33 .14 2.3 .03 
Interpersonal 
Events at Time 2 
Negative -.05 .14 -.38 .71 
Achievement 
Events at Time 2 








Mood at Time 1 .10 .13 .77 .45 
Mood at Time 2 -.46 .13 -3.63 .002 
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Note. The overall R-squared for the model was .80, 
which was highly significant, £(17)= 8.31, ~ < 
.0001 
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The form of this interaction can be seen in Figure 1. 
Here, the slope representing the association of negative 
interpersonal events with increase in depression is plotted 
separately for those low (one S.D. below the sample mean, or 
z = -1) and those high (one S.D. above the sample mean, or z 
= +1) in sociotropy. The resulting pattern fits with the 
predicted role of sociotropy. Specifically, those high in 
sociotropy (z = +l) showed a stronger positive association 
of negative I events with increased depression from Time 1 
to 2 than that shown for those low in sociotropy (z = -1). 
In fact, simple slope testing revealed that the slope of 
linear association was significant for high sociotropy, 
L(l7) = 2.81, Q = .01, whereas that for low sociotropy was 
not, L(l7) = .12, Q = .91. Thus, it appeared that higher 
frequencies of negative I events did not relate to greater 
increase in depression for those low in sociotropy. 
Also as predicted, the sociotropy x A events 
interaction was not significant, suggesting that the 
moderating effect of sociotropy holds only for 
thematically-matched negative life events. 
Autonomy 
A second, parallel regression model was constructed to 
examine the moderating role of autonomy. Depression at Time 
2 was regressed on depression at Time 1, autonomy, negative 
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two additional predictor terms were constructed, this time 
representing the interaction of autonomy with negative l 
events and with negative A events. If autonomy does indeed 
moderate the impact of negative achievement-related events 
on depression, as predicted, then the autonomy x A events 
interaction should emerge as significant. At the same time, 
as autonomy is not predicted to moderate the impact of 
negative interpersonal events on depression, the autonomy x 
I events interaction should not emerge as significant. 
The resulting standardized regression coefficients and 
corresponding significance tests are presented in Table 4. 
The only significant predictors were depression at Time 1 
and relative mood at Time 2, both related as in the previous 
regression. Neither an average association or A events with 
change in depression nor an association moderated by 
autonomy was evident. Significantly, the congruency 
prediction was not confirmed for autonomy. 
TABLE 4 
RESULTS FOR REGRESSION EXAMINING AUTONOMY 
IN RELATION TO DEPRESSION AT TIME 2 
Variable Beta Standard Error .t. 
Depression .73 .15 4.74 .0002 
at Time 1 
Autonomy -.11 .16 -.67 .51 
Negative .29 .17 1. 68 .11 
Interpersonal 
Events at Time 2 
Negative -.007 . 16 -.05 .96 
Achievement 
Events at Time 2 








Mood at Time 1 .02 .16 .13 .90 
Mood at Time 2 -.42 .15 -2.8 .01 
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Note: The overall R-squared of the model was .708, 
which was highly significant, E(17)= 5.15, ~= .002 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The personality dimensions of sociotropy and autonomy 
were examined as potential moderators of the impact of 
negative life events on level of depression. In line with 
the congruency hypothesis, it was predicted that increases 
in self-reported level of depression as a result of negative 
interpersonal events occurring within a four-week interval 
would be greater for those participants higher in 
sociotropy. It was also predicted that increases in 
depression as a result of negative achievement-related 
events would be greater for those higher in autonomy. The 
study was designed to overcome several limitations in past 
research on the topic, affording a more refined test of the 
hypothesis. 
The results supported the predicted moderating role of 
sociotropy but not autonomy, offering partial support for 
the congruency hypothesis. Furthermore, the significance of 
sociotropy was specific to the interpersonal domain; it did 
not moderate the impact of negative achievement-related 
events. Finally, neither autonomy nor sociotropy were 
independently associated with change in depression. Given 
the use of standardized variables in the analysis, this 
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implies that, on average, neither personality dimension can 
be judged to be depressogenic in and of itself. RatherJ it 
is only in conjunction with negative interpersonal events 
that sociotropy becomes a vulnerability factor for 
depression. 
The present pattern of results is consistent with most 
previous findings in the area. Sociotropy has been 
repeatedly found to be a significant moderating factor in 
depressive reactions to life stress (e.g., Hammen et. Al., 
1989; Robins, 1990; Robins & Block, 1988). The role of 
autonomy, however, has been less clear. In fact, only one 
previous study (Clark & Oates, 1995) has clearly confirmed 
its predicted moderating influence. 
Given the effort to use an improved methodology in this 
study, the absence of effects for autonomy is notable. It 
presents the possibility that the failure of most past 
studies to confirm the predictions relating to autonomy may 
be due to more than just methodological problems. For 
example, it may be that high autonomy is misconceived as 
being primarily a vulnerability factor for depression. 
Rather, the autonomy and self-determination it implies may 
actually promote adaptive coping with achievement-related 
stressors. If so, high autonomy may play a stress-buffering 
role in addition to any vulnerability it relates to. This 
could well offset its positive association to changes in 
depression and could result in null findings such as those 
yielded in the present study. 
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Another possible explanation for the repeated failure 
to confirm the moderating role of autonomy relates to the 
dimensionality of this construct. As Clark, Beck, and Brown 
(1992) point out, autonomy appears to be a more complex 
aspect of personality than sociotropy. In line with this 
claim, several researchers have found a multiple factors in 
the autonomy subscale of the SAS. Two studies have found 
four separate dimensions, interpretable as achievement, need 
for control, competitiveness, and counter dependency, to 
make up autonomy (Nietzel & Harris, 1990; Robins and Block, 
1988). Elsewhere, three dimensions, interpretable as 
solitude, independence, and individualistic achievement, 
have been found (Clark & Beck, 1991). This multidimen-
sionality offers up the possibility that the separate 
aspects of autonomy may hold divergent independent and 
interactive associations with other psychological variables, 
including depression. If so, the failure to find an overall 
moderating role for autonomy would not be particularly 
surprising. In the present study, examination of the 
dimensions of autonomy considered separately was prohibited 
by the limited degrees of freedom. In future research, 
however, larger samples could be used to overcome this 
problem and thereby enable the separate aspects of autonomy 
to be simultaneously tested against the congruency 
hypothesis. 
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Finally, Nietzel and Harris (1990) suggest that the 
clearer role of sociotropy in depression may be due to 
differences in coping strategies. That is, highly 
sociotropic individuals may display poorer coping strategies 
in response to congruent life events and so experience 
longer and more severe depressive reactions. In contrast, 
highly autonomous individuals may be challenged by 
achievement-related stressors as predicted, but may respond 
more effectively and therefore enjoy quicker recovery from 
setbacks. This adaptation would be reflected in less 
pronounced increase in depressive symptoms and would to some 
extent obscure the moderating role of autonomy. To explore 
this possibility, future research is needed to examine how 
high sociotropy/low autonomy and low sociotropy/high 
autonomy persons differentially cope with negative life 
events. 
In ascribing wider significance to the present 
findings, it is important to recognize several limitations 
of the study. First, the use of a non-clinical sample 
limits generalizability to clinical depression. In fact, 
the direct import the findings is for understanding temporal 
variation in normal levels of depressive thoughts and 
feelings. Furthermore, the use of graduate students as 
participants results in a highly selective sample that may 
differ from other generally non-depressed populations in 
potentially important ways (e.g. depth of self-awareness). 
Caution must therefore be taken not to over interpret the 
theoretical implications of these findings for depression. 
Replication of the findings with other populations, 
including clinical populations, would aid in extending the 
generality of the conclusions reached here. 
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The small size of the sample reinforces the need for 
replication. In addition, the exclusively female sample 
leaves unknown the significance of gender for the processes 
at issue. Further research is therefore needed to see if 
the effects observed here differ significantly for men vs. 
women. 
The prospective design used in this study avoids some 
of the interpretational limitations of cross-sectional 
designs. Even so, the four-week interval between the two 
assessments is a very brief period of time to observe both 
major changes in depressive symptoms and the occurrence of 
significant negative life events. This would imply a 
relatively insensitive, low-power test of the congruency 
hypothesis. That the hypothesis was partially confirmed 
through this study perhaps attests to the strength of the 
phenomenon in relation to sociotropy. The failure to 
confirm the expected role of autonomy, however, may relate 
to the difficulty of discerning more subtle effects within 
such a short time period. This issue could only be 
addressed through prospective studies of greater duration. 
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Though a prospective correlational study provides 
greater clarity in regard to causal relations, ambiguities 
remain. For example, it is known that the accurate 
self-report of negative life events can be facilitated by 
negative mood (see Segal, 1988). If so, it is entirely 
possible that participants with higher levels of depression 
at Time 2 reported more negative events than participants 
with lower levels of depression in part because of superior 
memory for such events. This tendency could inflate the 
estimated coefficients for frequency of negative life events 
in the regression models, exaggerating its causal relation 
with change in depression. More importantly, however, this 
inflation would not effect the estimated coefficients for 
the interaction terms, leaving critical hypothesis-testing 
free of this form of bias. 
Further examination of the significance of 
sociotropy/autonomy for depression seem warranted. Such 
research may help illuminate distinct depressive pathways 
involving personality/life event interactions, and thereby 
permit a greater theoretical understanding of the disorder. 
Clinical ImQlications 
Contributions could be realized at the applied end as 
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well. As Beck (1983) has pointed out, a client's standing 
on the two dimensions could be used to inform the 
therapist's intervention strategy, as it would reflect 
likely vulnerabilities to be addressed. In addition to 
differing vulnerabilities, the client's response to the same 
type of therapeutic interventions may also differ. Thus, a 
better understanding of the these dimensions could allow a 
better targeted course of therapy. 
According to Beck (1983), individuals in the autonomous 
mode may be pessimistic or indifferent to therapy. It is 
important to recognize that the client may feel defeated, 
incompetent, or useless. The therapist would need to 
emphasize a collaborative relationship designed to restore 
the individual's sense of competence and his optimism 
regarding important goals. In contrast to the highly 
sociotropic client, there may be less emphasis on 
introspective work and the main thrust may be to clarify the 
client's goals. The outcome of the therapy could be the 
development of flexibility and adaptability for the 
individual to cultivate an internal sense of freedom. 
On the other hand, the relationship and introspective 
work are more important for individuals in the sociotropic 
mode. The highly sociotropic individual is more inclined to 
seek help and be open to the therapist's explanations and 
clarifications. Interpretations are much valued by the 
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client and may facilitate the process of change. The 
therapeutic work can focus on the client's definition a.nd 
understanding of his acceptability and lovableness since 
rejection and abandonment are of primary concern for this 
client (Beck, 1983). Again, further understanding of these 
personality dimensions could contribute to and facilitate 
the therapeutic process. 
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Please indicate how much you agree with each of the 32 
statements below. Be as honest and as accurate as possible. 
Do not skip any statements. Respond to the statements in 




2 3 4 5 
strongly 
agree 
Indicate your responses by placing a number (1-5) in the 









I find it difficult to be separated from people I 
love. 
It is important to be liked and approved of by 
others. 
I find it hard to pay attention to a long 
conversation, even with friends. 
I would rather take personal responsibility for 
getting the job done than depend on someone else. 
When I achieve a goal I get more satisfaction from 
reaching the goal than from any praise I might get 
I like to be certain that there is somebody close 
I can contact in case something unpleasant 
happens to me. 
It is more important that I know I've done a good 
job than having others know it. 
I am very uncomfortable when a close friend or 




















I prefer to "work out" my personal problems by 
myself. 
It is very important that I feel free to get up 
and go wherever I want. 
I value work accomplishments more than I value 
making friends. 
The possibility of being rejected by others for 
standing up for my rights would not stop me. 
I don't enjoy what I am doing when I don't feel 
that someone in my life really cares about me. 
I often find myself thinking about friends or 
family. 
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It is more important to be active and doing things 
than having close relations with other people. 
It is important to me to be free and independent. 
I enjoy accomplishing things more than being given 
credit for them. 
I am usually the last person to hear that I've 
hurt someone by my actions. 
I prefer learning from my own mistakes rather than 
being corrected by others. 
I get lonely when I am home by myself at night. 
People rarely come to me with their personal 
problems. 
When I have a problem, I like to go off on my own 
and think it through rather than being 
influenced by others. 
I set my own standards and goals for myself rather 
than accepting those of other people. 
I prize being a unique individual more than being 
a member of a group. 
If somebody criticizes my appearance, I feel I am 








I tend to be direct with people and say what I 
think. 
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I tend to fret and worry over my personal problems 
Sometimes I hurt family and close friends without 
knowing that I've done anything wrong. 
I become particularly annoyed when a task is not 
completed. 
If I think I am right about something, I feel 
comfortable expressing myself even if others don't 
like it. 
Often I fail to consider the possible negative 
consequences of my actions. 
When I am having difficulty solving a problem, I 
would rather work it out for myself than have 
someone show me the solution. 
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LIFE EVENTS RECORD 
Now think back over any significant events-both positive 
events and negative events-that have occurred in your· life 
during the past FOUR WEEKS. Significant events are things 
that happened that affected you in a memorable way ( for 
example: failing a test, losing a friend, damaging your car, 
winning a prize, getting a job, joining a club, etc.). It 
does not matter that other people might find the same events 
insignificant for them. Briefly (in a sentence) describe each 
of your significant events below. Space is provided for up to 
ten events. For each event you describe, indicate whether it 
had a positive or negative psychological impact on you by 
placing a mark (x) in one of the two spaces. Then, decide how 
strong or intense an impact the positive or negative event had 
on you, using the following scale: 
1 2 
very mild 
3 4 5 
moderate 
6 7 8 9 
very strong 
Indicate the intensity rating by placing a number (1-9) in 
the space provided. 
For example: If you feel that a recent illness had a very bad 
effect on how you thought and felt about things, you might 
rate the intensity as 8 or 9. If it had only a slight effect 
on you, you might rate the intensity as 1 or 2. Similarly, if 
winning $1000 dollars i~ a lottery made you extremely happy 
for days, you might rate the intensity as high-8 or 9. If it 
made you happy, but less extremely so, you might rate the 
intensity as 5 or 6. Be as honest and accurate as possible. 
Event 1 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
Event 2 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
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Event 3 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
Event 4 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
Event 5 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
Event 6 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
Event 7 Impact: _Negative Positive Intensity ---
Description: ---------------------------
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BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY 
For each of the 21 sets of statements below, mark (X) the 
box in front of the statement that best reflects how you are 
feeling lately. Mark only ONE statement in each set. Be as 
honest and as accurate as possible. Do not skip any sets. 
Respond to the sets in the order they appear. 
1. 9 I do not feel sad. 
9 I feel blue or sad. 
9 I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap out of 
it. 
9 I am so sad or unhappy that it is very painful. 
9 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
2. 9 I am not particularly pessimistic or discouraged 
about the future. 
9 I feel discouraged about the future. 
9 I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
9 I feel that I won't ever get over my troubles. 
9 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things 
cannot improve. 
3. 9 I do not feel like a failure. 
9 I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
9 I feel I have accomplished very little that is 
worthwhile or that means anything. 
9 As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of 
failures. 
9 I feel I am a complete failure as a person (parent, 
husband, wife). 
4. 9 I am not particularly dissatisfied. 
9 I feel bored most of the time. 
9 I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
9 I don't get satisfaction out of anything any more. 
9 I am dissatisfied with everything. 
5. 9 I don't feel particularly guilty. 
9 I feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time. 
9 I feel quite guilty. 
9 I feel bad or unworthy practically all the time now. 
9 I feel as though I am very bad or worthless. 
6. 9 I don't feel I am being punished. 
9 I have a feeling that something bad may happen to me. 
9 I feel I am being punished or will be punished. 
9 I feel I deserve to be punished. 
9 I want to be punished. 
7. 9 I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
9 I am disappointed in myself. 
9 I don't like myself. 
9 I am disgusted with myself. 
9 I hate myself. 
8. 9 I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
9 I am very critical of myself for my weaknesses or 
mistakes. 
9 I blame myself for everything that goes wrong. 
9 I feel I have many bad faults. 
9. 9 I don't have any thoughts of harming myself. 
9 I have thoughts of harming myself but I would not 
carry them out. 
9 I feel I would be better off dead. 
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9 I feel my family would be better off if I were dead. 
9 I would kill myself if I could. 
10. 9 I don't cry any more than usual. 
9 I cry more now than I used to. 
9 I cry all the time now. I can't stop it. 
9 I used to be able to cry but now I can't cry at all 
even though I want to. 
11. 9 I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
9 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used 
to. 
9 I feel irritated all the time. 
9 I don't get irritated at all at the things that used 
to irritate me. 
12. 9 I have not lost interest in other people. 
9 I am less interested in other people now than I used 
to be. 
9 I have lost most of my interest in other people and 
have little feeling for them. 
9 I have lost all my interest in other people and don't 
care about them at all. 
13. 9 I make decisions about as well as ever. 
9 I am less sure of myself now and try to put off 
making decisions. 
9 I can't make decisions any more without help. 
9 I can't make any decisions at all any more. 
14. 9 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
9 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
9 I feel that there are permanent changes in my 
appearance and they make me look unattractive. 
9 I feel that I am ugly or repulsive looking. 
15. 9 I can work about as well as before. 
9 It takes extra effort to get started at doing 
something. 
9 I don't work as well as I used to. 
9 I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
9 I can't do any work at all. 
16. 9 I can sleep as well as usual. 
9 I wake up more tired in the morning than I used to. 
9 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it 
hard to get back to sleep. 
9 I wake up early every day and can't get more than 5 
hours sleep. 
17. 9 I don't get any more tired than usual. 
9 I get tired more easily than I used to. 
9 I get tired from doing anything. 
9 I get too tired to do anything. 
18. 9 My appetite is no worse than usual. 
9 My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
9 My appetite is much worse now. 
9 I have no appetite at all any more. 
19. 9 I haven't lost much weight lately. 
9 I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
9 I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
9 I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
20. 9 I am no more concerned about my health than usual. 
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9 I am concerned about aches and pains or upset stomach 
or constipation or other unpleasant feelings. 
9 I am so concerned with how I feel or what I feel that 
it's hard to think of much else. 
9 I am completely absorbed in what I feel. 
21. 9 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest 
in sex. 
9 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
9 I am much less interested in sex now. 
9 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
RELATIVE MOOD ITEM 
We would like to know how you are feeling 
Please rate your present mood in comparison 
felt on average over the past few days. 










at this moment. 
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